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This paper examines de jure and de facto measures of regulations, finding the relationship between them is neither one for one, nor linear. "Doing Business" provides indicators of the formal time and costs associated with fully complying with regulations. Enterprise Surveys report the actual experiences of a wide range of firms. First, there are significant variations in reported times to complete the same transaction by firms facing the same formal policy. Second, regulatory compliance appears "under water" as firms report actual times much less than the Doing Business reported days. Third, the data reveal substantial differences between favored and disfavored firms in the same location. Favored firms show This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Financial and Private Sector Development. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mhallward@worldbank.org. minimal variation, so Doing Business has little predictive power for the times they report. For disfavored firms, the variation is greater, although still not significantly correlated with Doing Business. Fourth, where multiple Enterprise Surveys are available, there is little association over time, with reductions in Doing Business days as likely to be accompanied by increases in Enterprise Surveys days. Comparing these two types of measures suggests very different ways of thinking about policy versus policy implementation, what "a climate" for firms in a country might mean, and what the options for "policy reform" really are. Introduction Over the last decade there have been two major initiatives to measure the -investment climate‖ that private sector firms face in developing countries, both with the goal of discovering and promoting those government policies and actions that could accelerate (broad based) economic growth.
Far and away the most famous of these has been the Doing Business (DB) indicators supported by the World Bank. DB assesses 10 elements of a country's policies that relate to private firms (e.g. starting a business, hiring workers, trading across borders, dealing with construction permits). DB provides ‗league tables' on each of these 10 regulatory areas separately, as well as providing a widely cited overall -Ease of Doing Business‖ ranking (e.g. in the 2010 ranking, Singapore as ranked number one and Central African Republic at 183).
1 The DB exercise assesses the country's -investment climate‖ with experts that examine the relevant laws and procedures to assess the time and cost of compliance with the variety of governmental regulations, as well as the ease with which a variety of contracts between private parties can be entered into and enforced.
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A parallel effort, also carried out by the World Bank, has surveyed firms in developing countries. This questionnaire includes modules that ask about the firm and its operations, what the firms perceive as obstacles to their own business and about their interactions with 3 government in policy compliance. These Enterprise Surveys (ES) 3 have now covered over 100,000 firms in 117 countries, some with repeat surveys. 4 The metaphor of a -climate‖ for these measures is instructive. Every day newspapers report the temperature in cities around the world. Suppose in each city there was both an official thermometer and thousands of outdoor thermometers in houses around the city. What do we expect from these measurements if we are capturing places with meaningful difference climates? 5 First, the variance of the outdoor temperatures around a given city (at a specified time of day, etc.) should be small compared to the inter-city variability: if it is hot in Phoenix and cool in Boston, it is hotter everywhere in Phoenix than anywhere in Boston. Second, regressing household temperature in city X on official temperature in city X would produce a coefficient near one. Third, one would expect the variance across household reported temperatures to be invariant to the official temperature. Fourth, changes in the official temperature would be highly associated with changes in outdoor household temperatures. indicators the linear slope of the regression of country average of ES and DB is well less than, and statistically different from, one (for two of the three the slope is not statistically different from zero). When we relax the assumption of linearity (either by allowing one or two splines or a quartic in DB) we find that over the lower ranges of DB there is a weak relationship, but as the DB days rise to even modest levels the association disappears.
For firms in the ES samples there is typically -water in the regulations‖ (when countries had very high tariffs there was -water in the tariffs‖ when the tariff was so high demand would remain zero even if the tariff was reduced). The DB assessment of the regulations imply that there is massive -water in the regulations‖-that is, the firms report that it takes then considerably less time to accomplish the tasks than the DB indicators suggest as the -official‖ climate. For instance, the DB indicators report it takes 411 days to get a construction permit in 
II. Description of the data
The two large-scale, multiple year, multiple country data collection efforts undertaken by the World Bank, each of which uses a different approach to understanding the constraints facing the private sector. DB provides measures of compliance with regulatory requirements and ES provides firms' reported experiences associated with regulations and other investment climate conditions. By using them together, this paper explores the relationship between de jure and de facto measures of regulations.
DB provides indicators in 10 regulatory areas of the number of procedures, the time and costs associated with complying with formal requirements. It uses a hypothetical -standard‖ firm (e.g. a privately and domestically owned, limited liability company with 10-50 employees operating in the country's largest city) and standardized transactions that could apply to many different activities (e.g. building a warehouse; enforcing a contract worth twice the country's income per capita). It explicitly assumes full compliance, that no third parties are used to facilitate completing procedures and that no payments or other activities are undertaken to influence policy outcomes. The measures are compiled by one to four lawyers or accountants in 7 each country based on the typical times it would take to comply based on their assessment of the actual wording of the regulations as they exist on the books.
Despite its emphasis on measuring regulations on the books, there are a few instances where DB ends up including some steps that are not purely regulatory in nature. For example, the DB indicator for ‗trading across borders' actually has 4 sub-components, one of which is -inland transportation.‖ Beyond the mixing of some regulatory and non-regulatory components, this also raises questions about how the indicator was measured. It is estimated by a single (or sometimes a couple of) lawyers in the capital city -based on their understanding of their clients'
experiences. As lawyers in large firms, their clients are unlikely to be representative of more typical firms' experiences, nor are these lawyers the business people with experience in this area.
For this work, we thus remove the ‗inland transportation' portion of the DB indicator. For the other two indicators, there could also be some steps in some countries that do not seem to be completely regulatory in nature. However, the number of steps and their categorization is not standardized across countries, and concerned of adding more measurement error by selectively deleting some in some countries, no changes have been made. senior managers about how long it takes to get various regulatory procedures done and how much they cost -including actions to influence policy implementation, like bribes or gifts or meeting with government officials. 6 The full spectrum of firms by size are included, as well as foreign and state owned enterprises, so one can compare the experiences across types of firms.
In making comparisons across the two sources of data, there are three regulatory areas covered by both DB and the ES instruments with sufficient numbers of firm responses 7 : time to get operating licenses, time to get construction permits and time to clear goods through customs.
While the same regulatory areas are covered, it should be remembered that the questions are not asked exactly the same way. First, DB provides very precise instructions on what to include or 8 not in the measure, while the ES simply asks ‗how long did it take to get a construction permit?' Some of the variation within the ES is no doubt due to the fact that respondents may have different notions of which steps they did and did not include in their assessment. Second, ES respondents are also unlikely to have precise records as to the length of time procedures took, and so will report estimates. Both of these points are potential sources of measurement error, but are unlikely to drive the patterns we see, particularly across countries.
Third, DB has a precisely defined -standard‖ firm conducting the transaction, e.g. a 10-50 employee, domestically owned private company. The ES are a sample of firms -both larger and smaller than 10-50 employees -and different ownership types. It is possible that some of the variation within country in the ES is that the regulatory requirements themselves vary by firm size or ownership. However, only using those firms that match the characteristics of the ‗standard' hypothetical DB firm, leads to the same basic empirical results as the ones we report-but does reduce sample sizes so we stick to the full samples.
The fourth difference between the DB and ES is the most interesting one: the assumption that firms fully comply -and with no direct or third-party facilitation (monetary or otherwise)
involved. But firms do not necessarily comply in the ways anticipated in the DB instrument.
The respondents in the ES themselves report that additional payments are frequently made to ‗help get things done.' Moreover, as we show, if what firms report as their experiences mirrored the formal requirements, the data in the graphs comparing the two across countries would line up along a 45 degree line. The size of the gap between the two sources of data (i.e. how far below the 45 degree line most of the observations in the graphs are) illustrates how costly it would be not to try to strike a deal -and that assuming no deals are made does not, in fact, reflect what firms do.
III. Comparing Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys
What is the connection between the DB indicators and the average value reported by the firms in the ES? For each of the three indicators (imports, operating license, and construction permit) we provide scatter plots (Figures 1a, 1b, 1c ) and regression results using a variety of functional forms (Table 1 ). All three indicators have roughly similar patterns that:
(i) for most of the range of the data the average firm is far -under water‖ in that the time reported by firms is far less than the reported time in DB
(ii) the cross-national correlation between the two indicators, even at the country level, is very weak, with R-Squared coefficients well below .05 for operating licenses and construction permits.
(iii) there is an apparent non-linear pattern in which as the DB days increases from low levels the corresponding ES average value increases (though well less thhan one for one) but at higher values the slope becomes quite flat and increases in DB do little to increase the reported ES average.
Since we are using regressions merely as a data summary technique we did not want to impose any particular strong functional form or constraints on the non-linearity of the relationships that might emerge. Therefore, we estimated four different functional forms. We allowed splines (kinks but with continuity) of three different types: (a) a single spline at the median, (b) two even placed splines and (c) an -optimal‖ or goodness of fit maximizing choice of two splines 8 . In addition we just use a quartic specification.
Imports. Figure 1a shows the relations between the DB indicator for time taken for imports (less inland transport time) compared to the days that firms reported it took them for imports. The figures show the predicted values for each of the four functional forms, which in this case are quite similar. As seen in table 1, the simple linear OLS regression produces a coefficient of .14, which is significantly different from either 0 or 1 and produces an R2 of .129-so only a small fraction of the cross-national variation in firm reported average time is associated with the variation in DB.
Moreover, all of the functional forms show sharply lower coefficients connecting the two variables as the value of the DB indicator is higher. For instance, the slope of the quartic at the 10 th percentile (10 days) of the DB is .482 versus only .07 at the 50 th percentile (23 days). All of the splines show similar results, with sharply lower slopes when the DB values are above even modest values-the -optimal‖ two kink spline suggests the slope is only .11 above 13 days 9 .
The predicted mean ES reported days is only 4 days higher for a country with a DB of 58 days versus a DB of 20 days. This leaves the countries with high DB values -under water‖ as the average time is well below the DB time-for Kazakhstan the DB time is 38 days higher than the ES average.
9 Given the overall weak relationships the F-tests show none of the splines for imports are statistically significant. First, there is zero correlation between the two overall so the simple OLS regression coefficient rounds to zero, is not statistically different from zero (though again, one for one can be rejected) and the R2 is also (naturally) near zero. Second, while for the other indicators countries are under water roughly over the entire range of the data, countries are not consistently underwater until they pass roughly 50 days-though after that point every country but Peru has an ES value lower than its DB value. Third, as can be seen from the scatter diagram the non-linear forms
give a very strongly upward sloping relationship at low values but then appear to have a negative slope (to accommodate the cluster of countries at 40-60 DB days but low ES average days) and then in the higher range flattens out (or is negative). However, none of the splines are statistically significant so that just zero association over all ranges of the data cannot be rejected.
IV. DB and "favored" and "disfavored" firms in the ES
The ES data reveal that, for any given country or question, there are enormous reported differences across firms. When firms are asked about time to obtain an operating license, construction permit, or clear goods through customs the responses not only do not cluster tightly around the DB average but do not cluster around the ES average. A significant fraction of firms report that (their version of) regulatory compliance takes essentially not time at all, while others report significant delays. So there is an important question of how the levels of the DB indicators are associated with the dispersion and entire distribution of firm level responses. One notion might be that an increase in the DB time from say 20 days to 50 days would just shift the entire distribution up, so that all firms would have roughly X additional days. However that is not at all what the data suggest. Rather the data suggest that the -favored‖ firms are affected roughly not at all by increases in the DB figure while, at low levels the dispersion increases as the firms who report relatively long delays report longer delays as the DB value goes up, but only to a point, after which there is roughly no effect on the distribution of responses at all.
The figures 2a, 3a and 4a show the scatter plots for each country of the 10 th and the 90 th percentile of the firm responses plotted against the DB for imports, business licenses, and construction permits respectively to show how the dispersion of ES responses evolves with DB.
One common pattern is clearest for construction permits (Figure 3a) . When the DB value moves from its lowest value of 77 days (for Lesotho) to the (third) highest value of 471 days in Ukraine the predicted 10 th percentile (using the two spline specification) increases from 4.5 days to 8.2-hence a 400 day increase in the DB value is associated with a less than 4 days increase in the predicted value of the 10 th percentile (and only 5 and a half days in the 25 th percentile). In sharp contrast, the increase from 77 days to the tercile of 172 (Laos) increases the predicted ES response in the two spline specification from 29 days to 189 days while the change from 172 days to 471 days (Ukraine) leads to a small decrease in predicted ES responses at the 90 th percentile from 189 days to 167 days.
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The result of this, as seen in Table 3 , is that there is essentially no difference in the responses of firms at the low end of the distribution no matter what the country DB value is, but substantial differences in the higher end. So for instance, the range of the DB data on imports is 80 days (84 versus 4) while the difference in the 10 th percentile is only 2.6 days and the 25 th percentile is 4.7 days. This implies the -favored‖ firms in the -worst‖ rated countries by the DB indicator do much better than the -disfavored‖ firms in the -best‖ rated DB countries. So the 10 th percentile firm in Uzbekistan, the country with the highest DB ranking of 84 days, is predicted to get imports through customs in 3.7 days versus 4.4 days for the 75 th percentile firm in Estonia, with a DB ranking of only 4 days.
But on the other side, nearly all of the action happens at the upper end, the -disfavored‖ firms. As detailed above, the DB range of 524 days from the -best‖ to -worst‖ in construction permits produces a predicted 25 th percentile difference of less than 2 days. However, the 90 th percentile firm has a difference of 140 days between -best‖ and worst‖-and again, essentially all of this increase happens between the lowest DB value (77days) and the 25 th percentile (155 days). 
V. Variability in the ES results
The next question is whether the variance across firms in the ES surveys increases or decreases with the increase in the DB indicator. Figures 5a, 5b , and 5c show the 90 th -10 th percentile spread for each country for imports, construction permits, and operating license. In this case, the indicators show different patterns. For construction permits the cross-country variance increases with DB at first, then flattens out entirely (consistent with the results in Table 2 showing that the 22 10 th percentile in ES was invariant to DB while the 90 th first increased then flattened out). With imports ( Figure 5b) the spread increases and then flattens out-but continues to increase.
Finally, there is no apparent relationship between the ES spread in operating license and the DB value ( Figure 5c ).
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24 Table 4 is the regression equivalent of the figures which shows that the tendencies in the graphs are typically not statistically significant. For construction permits for instance the lowest slope is 1.22 and falls to .010 and -.018 in the upper ranges of the DB data. However, the F-test on the spline terms fails to reject that 1.22 and .010 are different because the standard errors on each coefficient are so large-the data cannot reject that 1.22 is equal to zero (t-stat is only 1.84) so cannot reject it is equal to .01. 
VI. Comparing changes in Doing Business with changes in ES
The results shown so far are based on cross-national comparisons in which we have matched the DB indicator to the year of the ES survey. DB has been updated annually since its introduction in 2003. However, the ES have been repeated in only a few countries, generally with a 3-5 year lag. This section uses only those countries for which an ES was fielded, there was then a formal change in the regulation that manifests as a reduction in the formal time expected for the requirement to be met, and another ES fielded. For operating licenses there are only eight countries so there is nothing -statistical‖ that can be said (Figure 6c ). There is one country, Bulgaria, that actually increased it requirements, so its arrow points to the right. But the change in reported averages ranges considerably, with many countries having higher reported averages despite reductions in official times to complete requirements. Where the average reported times rose, so did the spread of times across firms.
Some countries did have downward sloping estimates, such as KGZ (keep in mind in these graphs the DB scale is two and half times as large as the ES scale). 
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These graphs have drawn on the full range of firms in the ES sample. As discussed above, DB strictly applies to the firms in its hypothetical scenario it presents to its lawyers and accountants, i.e. private, domestically owned firms with 10-50 employees. With the additional requirement that there be at least 20 respondents for a country to be included, these restrictions on the types of firms results in fewer countries. However, the patterns are not significantly different. 
VII. Conclusion
So far, this is a paper Sergeant Joe Friday of the LAPD could love: it's just the facts. That said, Joe Friday, like the rest of us, was ultimately interested in piecing the facts into a coherent narrative that explains events. Our facts fit into four broad literatures related to policy and its impact on firm and economic performance.
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First, although ours is the first attempt to examine the differences between the Doing Business estimates of compliance times with the actual distribution of experienced times from firm surveys, our findings are building on earlier literatures about the heterogeneity of regulatory compliance in specific countries and sectors. A classic early contribution was Stone, Levy and Paredes (1996) which showed that a comparison of the formal regulations of registering a business in Chile versus Brazil would lead one to conclude that Chile as a much better place to do business as its formal regulations were stream-lined while the regulatory path to registering a firm in Brazil was -tortuous.‖ But, when they examined actual practice they found that in response to this difficulty of the formal regulations an industry of negotiating this on behalf of firms had emerged that made business registration -a fairly affordable one-stop process.‖ Pritchett and Sethi (1994) had many of the same findings for the collection of import tariffs.
They showed that: (a) the collected ad valorem tariff rates were much lower than the legal ad valorem tariff; (b) that collected tariff rates increased much less than one for one with legal tariffs; and (c) huge heterogeneity in collected tariff rates across items with the exact same legal tariff. Similarly, Gauthier and Gersovitz (1997) use a survey of firms in Cameroon to show how tax exemptions and evasion at the firm specific level cause massive deviations between the hypothetical de jure tax revenues if the tax code were applied and the actual revenues collected.
A recent application of randomization investigated the granting of driver's licenses in Delhi India (Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, Mullainathan 2007) and found that individuals who hired a tout were effectively exempted from one element of regulatory compliance (the driving exam)
while those who did not hire a tout did have to take the exam (and often failed). Our findings confirm at a cross-national scale and for a number of indicators the commonly observed, but hard to document, fact that policy implementation often deviates from the stated policy, in firm (or individual) specific ways.
Second, our findings are also related to the large literature on corruption and its relationship to firm profitability, regulatory compliance, and regulations themselves and hence on economic performance (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Fisman (2001) uses the connection between variations in the stock market value of firms in Indonesia, their connections to Suharto, and information about Suharto's health to show that often a significant value of the firm's value was due to their political connections, presumably because these connections allowed them greater profitability. Research on the transition in post-communist countries, in which 32 -institutions‖ were in flux showed that firms used their profits to both block future reform (Hellmann 1998), create -crony bias‖ through an -inequality of influence‖ that deterred other firms from relying on or engaging with state institutions (Hellmann and Kaufmann 2002), and even -capture‖ the state to change the laws and regulations themselves to disadvantage rivals (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000) . While this paper provides no direct evidence of corruption, the massive, firm specific deviations in reported compliance times and the deviation from the Doing Business estimated times to compliance are at least consistent with environments of policy implementation that are permeable. Indeed, earlier work that focused on Africa, found that where the gaps between DB and ES were larger, the frequency of bribes paid increased (Hallward-Driemeier, Khun-Jush and Pritchett 2010).
Third, a massive current puzzle for economists is explaining the differential response of economic growth to the policy reforms of the 1980s and 1990s-which some countries booming after modest reforms while others stagnating even after massive reforms (World Bank 2005) and more broadly the pattern of growth accelerations and decelerations (Hausmann, Pritchett, Rodrik 2005, Jones and Olken, 2007) . At least one hypothesis for explaining the differential responses to -policy reform‖ may be that when de jure and de facto policy have diverged the impact of de jure reform might have wildly different effects, depending on how it affects firm's distribution of expectations (both mean and variance) about their future experienced policy (Pritchett 2005) . To revert to the temperature analogy, the average daily high temperature in July is Phoenix is 105 but most people are not hot, they are indoors. How much would the experienced temperature change if the daily high were reduced to 100? To 95? Actually it might be somewhat higher as more people would be outdoors while those indoors would be the same temperature. On the other hand, if air conditioning were banned, experienced temperature would sky-rocket with no change in the climate. Given our evidence, it is a completely open question how DB indicators (as proxies for costs of compliance) would have to be before the experienced investment climate of most firms was affected-or became attractive to compliance constrained investors. In our previous paper -Deals versus Rules‖ (Hallward-Driemeier, Khun-Jush, and Pritchett 2010) we showed the firm performance was affected by measures of the variability of the policy implementation they faced, more so than the level. By the reverse of the same token, initiatives that have minimal impact on de jure policy but which signal a decisive shift in policy implementation might have substantial and immediate impacts on investor expectations and initiate an acceleration of growth 11 .
Finally, our evidence speaks to the emerging debates about -industrial policy‖ and its role in spurring -structural transformation‖ (Lin 2009 ) or moves through the -product space‖ (Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabasi, and Hausmann 2007) by acquiring -capabilities‖ (Hausmann and Hidalgo 2009 ). However, our data speak to this debate in two very different ways.
On the one hand, there is a notion that -industrial policy‖ is a danger because governments should only maintain a -level playing field‖ that treats all firms, activities, and sectors exactly alike and just make and neutrally enforce a set of rules. Whatever merits that might have where something like a level playing field could, in principle, be played on, our evidence strongly suggests that almost no firm is actually playing on a level playing field nowboth in that there appear to be massive deviations from compliance on average, and in the sense that those deviations vary widely across firms. Whether or not there optimally -should‖ be a level playing field there isn't one now, so industrial policy would be another form of -unlevel‖ not an -unleveling.‖ Very much on the other hand, our evidence could be easily taken as evidence of just how hard it is for governments to pursue discretionary industrial policy. With weak institutions the risks of available discretion being abused for -rent seeking‖ and -directly unproductive‖ activities along the lines of the classic critiques of Krueger (1974) are very real. There is nothing inherently contradictory about the notion that industrial policy, if one could implement it well, would accelerate growth but that most countries, and especially those that need growth the most, lack the wherewithal for policy implementation. This then raises as an important question whether or not one can square this circle and devise -institutionally robust‖ industrial policies capable of implementation even when overall institutions are weak (Hausmann and Rodrik 2006 , Rodrik 2008 ).
